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Following the 2007–2008 financial crisis, the attention of financial regulators
and academics has shifted from bank individual risk to bank systemic risk, that
is, banks' exposure to future systemic crises. In this paper, we examine whether
CEO overconfidence could explain cross-sectional heterogeneity in the systemic
risk of U.S. bank holding companies. Using measures of overconfidence based
on CEOs' options exercise behaviour and language used in the Managerial Dis-
cussion and Analysis of the 10K-filings, we find that banks with overconfident
CEOs have higher systemic risk than their counterparts with non-overconfident
CEOs. Banks with overconfident CEOs also have higher holding of private
mortgage-backed securities and higher leverage. During the 2007–2008 financial
crisis, banks with overconfident CEOs experienced higher realized systemic risk.
Our work shows that the behaviour of overconfident bank CEOs could impose
negative externalities beyond individual bank boundary.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
The 2007–2008 financial crisis has prompted intensive dis-
cussion about the systemic nature of the financial sector
(Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, & Richardson, 2017; Bisias,
Flood, Lo, & Valavanis, 2012; Kashyap, Rajan, &
Stein, 2010). While banks could become less risky individu-
ally, they could simultaneously impose greater risks to the
financial system (Nijskens & Wagner, 2011). Furthermore,
banks vary greatly in terms of the systemic risk that they
contribute to the financial sector. For example, Acharya
et al. (2017) report that the ex post systemic risk of
Citigroup and US Bancorp Del., as measured by the stock
returns during the crisis period, was −85.86% and −17.56%,
respectively. As bank regulators have increasingly been
concerned with the stability of the financial sector (Acharya
et al., 2017; Peltonen, Rancan, & Sarlin, 2019), a pertinent
question is what can explain substantial variations in banks'
contribution to a systemic event.
In this paper, we address the above question with the
literature of managerial personality traits. Our focus is on
overconfidence bias, a personality trait, which, if present,
could seriously impair managerial judgement about future
outcomes. The psychology literature has provided exten-
sive evidence that individuals over-estimate their own
ability and/or are unrealistically optimistic concerning the
likely outcome of good future events; and that executives
are more prone to this behavioural bias than the general
population (see, e.g., Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher,
Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995; Moore, 1977; Svenson, 1981;
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Weinstein, 1980). Research in corporate finance shows
that overconfident CEOs over-estimate the return to
investment projects (Malmendier & Tate, 2005), are more
likely to make acquisitions (Malmendier & Tate, 2008;
Roll, 1986) and are more willing to put their firms at risk
by undertaking risky activities (Galasso & Simcoe, 2011;
Hirshleifer, Low, & Teoh, 2012). We assert that in the
interconnected and systemic financial sector, this person-
ality bias could increase banks' contribution to a systemic
crisis and consequently generate negative externalities.1
Our attention is on bank CEOs because in a typical
bank, the CEO is considered the single most powerful
individual and his/her attitude is likely to influence the
organization's overall risk preference.2 Furthermore,
CEOs are more prone to overconfidence bias than the
general population (Malmendier, Tate, & Yan, 2011) and
such bias could be exaggerated by their celebrity/elite sta-
tus in the media (Hayward, Rindova, & Pollock, 2004).
Although most banks have boards of directors, risk com-
mittees and other governance mechanisms, these are not
always active, independent or effective in reining in CEO
behaviours (Ellul & Yerramilli, 2013). Larger boards are
even reported to associate with higher bank systemic risk
during the 2007–2008 crisis (Battaglia & Gallo, 2017).
Following Acharya et al. (2017), we measure systemic
risk as a bank's marginal expected shortfall (MES). This
is the expected amount the bank is undercapitalized in a
systemic event in which the overall financial system is
undercapitalized. Compared to other measures such as
CoVaR (Adrian & Brunnermeier, 2016) or tail betas
(De Jonghe, 2010),3 MES is conceptually different and
has more predictive power for the ex post losses during
the 2007–2008 crisis (Acharya et al., 2017).4 It is an ex
ante measure of systemic risk based on bank capital,
which is important for the financial sector stability. For
example, Beltratti and Stulz (2012) find that better capi-
talized banks perform better during the 2007–2008 crisis
(see also Laeven, Ratnovski, & Tong, 2015). Battaglia and
Gallo (2017) report that banks headquartered in
European countries with less restriction on capital have
more systemic risk during the crisis. In keeping with the
motivation of the paper, we also investigate whether
CEO overconfidence is associated with their banks' hold-
ing of private mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) which,
unlike any other type of loans, exposes banks to the
whole financial system (Bernanke et al., 2008;
Longstaff, 2010; Purnanandam, 2011; Thakor, 2015a).5,6
We use two measures of CEO overconfidence. The
first is based on CEO options exercise behaviour as in
Malmendier and Tate (2005) and Campbell, Gallmeyer,
Johnson, Rutherford, and Stanley (2011). The second is
based on the language/tone that CEOs use in the Mana-
gerial Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of banks'
10K-filings. Unlike the options-based proxy, which con-
siders overconfidence as a permanent personality trait
(Galasso & Simcoe, 2011; Malmendier & Tate, 2005), the
tone-based proxy is time-variant. This allows us to docu-
ment changes in the usage of optimistic language and
their association with bank systemic risk over time.7
Our empirical analysis of U.S. bank holding companies
(BHCs) shows that on average, banks with overconfident
CEOs have higher systemic risk, both measured as the ex
ante average dollar loss in market capitalization during
the worst 5% of market return days and as the ex post
losses during the 2007–2008 crisis, compared to banks
with non-overconfident CEOs. Banks with overconfident
CEOs also have higher holding of private MBSs and
higher leverage. In the aftermath of the financial crisis,
fewer CEOs are classified as being overconfident but we
find no evidence of a structural break in the relationship
between CEO overconfidence and bank systemic risk.
We recognize a certain caveat to our empirical analy-
sis, concerning the possibility of an endogenous relation-
ship between bank systemic risk and overconfident CEOs.
It may be that a bank's risk preference, which is not
directly observable, determines both its level of systemic
risk and the type of CEOs, overconfident or non-over-
confident, that it hires.8 Endogeneity may also present if
there is measurement error in our key variable, CEO over-
confidence. We conduct multiple checks to address this
potential endogeneity issue using different estimation
methods and measurements of CEO overconfidence.
Our work contributes to the growing literature that
explains cross-sectional variations in bank systemic risk.
Prior research focuses on bank- and sector-specific charac-
teristics and activities to explain bank systemic risk such
as size and capital (Laeven et al., 2015), interbank expo-
sures (Drehmann & Tarashev, 2013), non-traditional
banking activities (Brunnermeier, Dong, & Palia, 2012; De
Jonghe, 2010), cross-border banking networks (Peltonen
et al., 2019) and the seniority structure of banking liabili-
ties (Bougheas & Kirkman, 2018). We, on the other hand,
use a behavioural approach to provide novel evidence of
the effect of CEO-biased beliefs on bank systemic risk.
Our paper also contributes to the debate on whether
executive compensation structure encourages excessive
risk-taking behaviour in the financial sector. Cheng,
Hong, and Scheinkman (2015) show that bank individual
risk increases with the incentives embedded in bank
executives' compensation contracts. In contrast,
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) attribute higher bank risk
exposure to CEOs' misjudgement based on the evidence
that banks with higher incentives awarded to the CEOs
do not necessarily perform worse during the 2007–2008
crisis. Our results are consistent with and complement
Fahlenbrach and Stulz's finding.
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Finally, our work adds to the existing literature on
CEO overconfidence in an important way. Previous stud-
ies document that overconfident CEOs pursue risky activi-
ties and increase firm individual risk (Campbell
et al., 2011; Hirshleifer et al., 2012; Malmendier &
Tate, 2005, 2008). The few studies on CEO overconfidence
bias in the banking sector such as Ho, Huang, Lin, and
Yen (2016) and Black and Gallemore (2013) only address
the impact of overconfident CEOs on lending standards
and loan loss provisions. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first paper that shows how CEO-biased beliefs
can affect well beyond firm boundary. While lower lending
standards and loan loss provision (as addressed in Ho
et al., 2016 and Black & Gallemore, 2013) may associate
with higher bank systemic risk, these studies do not
directly measure banks' contribution to a systemic event
like our measure MES. Our results therefore have an
important implication: overconfidence bias among banks'
top decision makers may impose costly externalities to the
financial sector and the rest of the economy.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews
relevant literature and develops hypotheses about the
relationship between CEO overconfidence and bank sys-
temic risk. Section 3 describes data and methodology. We
present our empirical results in Section 4 and robustness
checks in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 | RELEVANT LITERATURE AND
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
2.1 | CEO overconfidence
Overconfidence bias is defined as unrealistic beliefs about
one's ability and skills and/or about the distribution of an
uncertain outcome, such as overstating the mean of possi-
ble outcomes, or over/under-estimating the likelihood of
positive/negative outcomes (see, e.g., Gilovich, Griffin, &
Kahneman, 2002; Hirshleifer et al., 2012; Schrand &
Zechman, 2012). The psychology literature has provided
compelling evidence that people have biased views about
their own competence compared to others such as being
better driver (Svenson, 1981), being in the top 30% of the
peer group (Alicke et al., 1995) or making more accurate
predictions (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977).
Weinstein (1980) describes unrealistic optimism about
future as people's tendency to believe that their prospects
are better than average, that is, positive outcomes (such as
getting a good job with high pay) are more likely to hap-
pen, while negative outcomes (such as having serious dis-
eases or family issues) are less likely to happen to them
than their peers. This literature also indicates that a com-
mon source of biased distribution of an uncertain outcome
is self-attribution bias, that is, individuals attribute good
outcomes to their ability and bad outcomes to external fac-
tors (Gilovich et al., 2002; Langer & Roth, 1975).
Overconfidence bias can explain actions of CEOs such
as using less conservative accounting (Ahmed &
Duellman, 2013), issuing more optimistic forecast
(Hribar & Yang, 2015) and intentionally misreporting
financial information (Schrand & Zechman, 2012). Prior
research also shows that this bias makes overconfident
CEOs more likely to put their firms at risk. Adam,
Fernando, and Golubeva (2015) report that overconfident
CEOs increase speculative activities even after losses have
been realized. Hirshleifer et al. (2012) find that over-
confident CEOs attempt to show their vision by investing
more heavily in innovative but risky projects. But the con-
sequences of CEO-biased beliefs in non-financial firms are
typically restricted to the firms themselves and unlikely to
trigger a systemic event. In the following section, we argue
that actions of overconfident CEOs in financial firms may
impose externalities that seriously affect other firms in the
sector and the rest of the economy.
2.2 | CEO overconfidence and bank
systemic risk
The banking sector is unique in its interconnected and sys-
temic nature. Any losses, illiquidity or insolvency of an
individual financial institution can quickly spread to and
seriously impair others in the financial sector (Bisias
et al., 2012; Drehmann & Tarashev, 2013). In a formal
game-theoretic model, Lagunoff and Schreft (2001) show
that a financial crisis can arise as losses spread among
financial institutions that have linkages through interre-
lated portfolios and payment commitments. In their model
of the banking system, Bougheas and Kirkman (2018) sug-
gest that the higher connectivity, which the seniority
structure of bank liabilities encourages, might exacerbate
systemic risk. Innovation such as securitization, while
improving liquidity in the mortgage market could lead to
‘an opaque web of interconnected obligations’ among
financial institutions and amplify losses into turmoil in
the financial market (Brunnermeier, 2009, p. 98).
Although much has been written on bank and sector
characteristics that could explain variations in systemic
risk (Brunnermeier et al., 2012; Laeven et al., 2015;
Peltonen et al., 2019) no prior study has analysed sys-
temic risk from bank CEOs' behavioural perspective. Yet
it is hard to dispute the influence that bank CEOs and
their beliefs about future outcomes have on bank policies.
Ho et al. (2016) postulate that overconfident CEOs over-
value the prospects of their borrowers, place less weight
on downside risk and consequently ease lending
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standards. Black and Gallemore (2013) show that over-
confident CEOs over-estimate the prospects of loan recov-
ery and thus recognize lower loan loss provisions. We
hypothesize that overconfident bank CEOs over-estimate
the prospects of future outcomes and/or their ability to
deliver good outcomes of risky activities which may sub-
ject their banks to higher systemic risk compared to
banks with non-overconfident CEOs.
Our argument is related to, but different from, the
theoretical model of Thakor (2015b). Thakor shows that
a systemic crisis may occur when, following a sufficiently
long sequence of good outcomes, investors and financial
institutions have unrealistic beliefs in the risk manage-
ment skills of bankers and consequently underestimate
the true risk of risky activities and invest more in high
risk products (Thakor, 2015b). The focus of our paper,
however, is the biased beliefs that bank CEOs have about
their own ability and the probability of the occurrence of
good future outcomes.
Investment in MBSs is an innovation unlike any other
bank activities. In the years leading to the 2007–2008
financial crisis, the MBSs appeared attractive in terms of
earnings and risk: they distributed risk among holders and
were often assigned high ratings by securities rating agen-
cies (Longstaff, 2010). Here we conjecture that over-
confident bank CEOs are attracted to the innovative
MBSs, perhaps in the same way as overconfident CEOs in
non-financial firms to high-risk innovations (as in
Galasso & Simcoe, 2011; Hirshleifer et al., 2012). However,
dramatic growth in the subprime mortgage market and
originating banks' deteriorating incentives to screen and
monitor mortgage deals led to decrease in quality and
increase in the risk of holding of these securities more than
previously estimated (Purnanandam, 2011). The MBSs
exposed banks to the whole financial system through
mortgage holdings of off-balance-sheet vehicles and claims
on counterparties that were exposed to subprime and other
complex securities (Bernanke et al., 2008; Longstaff, 2010),
increasing the likelihood that banks incur losses at the
same time (Brunnermeier et al., 2012; Nijskens &
Wagner, 2011). This demonstrates what Acharya, Engle,
and Richardson (2012) describe as a shock in the financial
market due to a change in the fundamental value of the
assets traded in the market. As Thakor (2015a) puts it, the
MBS holding of ‘interconnected and systemically impor-
tant institutions’ creates greater systemic risk (p. 170). The
above discussion leads to the following hypotheses:
H1 Banks with overconfident CEOs have higher systemic
risk than banks with non-overconfident CEOs.
H2 Banks with overconfident CEOs hold more MBSs
investment than banks with non-overconfident CEOs.
3 | DATA AND METHODS
3.1 | Data
Our analysis is based on a sample of CEOs of BHCs
which is the intersection of the following datasets:
Execucomp (for data on CEO compensation and CEO
characteristics), the quarterly FR-Y9C call reports from
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (for accounting and
financial data) and the EDGAR database on the SEC's
website (for the 10K-filings) from 1994 to 2014. As in
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), we exclude non-traditional
banking firms such as pure brokerage, insurance or
investment firms and use Compustat Bank and Ban-
kscope if there are missing accounting observations in
the FR-Y9C reports. We obtain stock returns from the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database.
All financial and accounting variables are winsorized at
1 and 99% to eliminate the effects of outliers. This process
yields a final sample of 1,236 firm-year observations with
164 banks and 238 CEOs.9
3.2 | Identification strategy
To measure the impact of CEO overconfidence on bank
systemic risk, we use the following model:
yi,t = α1 + α2OCi,t−1 + β
0Xi,t−1 + γ0Zi,t−1 + νi + μt + εi,t ð1Þ
where yi,t represents the dependent variables of interest,
which are systemic risk (MES) and private mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) for bank i in year t, OCi,t−1 is a
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if bank i has an
overconfident CEO in year t−1 and 0 otherwise, Xi,t−1 is a
vector of bank characteristics of bank i in year t−1, Zi,t−1
is a vector of CEO characteristics of the CEO of bank i in
year t−1, νi and μt are bank and year fixed effects, respec-
tively, and εi,t is the random error. We report the OLS
and the WLS estimations. While both provide qualita-
tively similar results, we prefer the WLS approach, which
uses bank size as weights to account for the fact that
U.S. banks vary greatly in size. This is also the popular
choice among studies of U.S. banks such as Ellul and
Yerramilli (2013) and Ho et al. (2016).
We recognize that our estimation process may suffer
from an endogeneity problem which, if present, could
confound the results and yield biased and inconsistent
estimates. Endogeneity may occur in our empirical analy-
sis due to omitted variables that may be correlated with
CEO overconfidence and at the same time determine
bank systemic risk. One may argue that a bank that pur-
sues an aggressive risk strategy may also hire a CEO who
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is more likely to implement this strategy. Such bank may
also structure the managerial compensation that encour-
ages risky behaviour and makes it more costly for share-
holders to monitor the managers (Bai & Elyasiani, 2013).
To address this concern, we include bank- and year-fixed
effects to control for unobserved omitted variables. Fur-
thermore, as in Battaglia and Gallo (2017), we control for
bank and CEO characteristics that are likely to affect
risk-taking decisions, all measured in the preceding year.
To deal with the concern that the nature of endo-
geneity in our estimation could be dynamic,10 for exam-
ple, bank risk strategy may change over time and when it
does it may simultaneously change bank systemic risk
and the types of CEO that banks hire, we also estimate a
dynamic panel GMM model as in Ellul and
Yerramilli (2013), using lags of systemic risk and bank
and CEO characteristics as instruments to take into
account bank past exposure to a systemic event in the
estimation.
3.3 | Measures of CEO overconfidence
As CEO overconfidence is not directly observable, extant
literature resorts to proxies that use CEOs' options
exercising or trading behaviour (Malmendier &
Tate, 2005, 2008), CEOs' language/tone (Davis, Piger, &
Sedor, 2012) or media portrayal of CEOs (Hirshleifer
et al., 2012; Malmendier & Tate, 2008). In this paper, we
use a stock options-based proxy and a tone-based proxy
for CEO overconfidence.
3.3.1 | Options-based measure of CEO
overconfidence
Following Malmendier and Tate (2005), we define CEOs
as being overconfident if they delay exercising stock
options that are 100% in the money, that is, if the stock
price exceeds the exercise price by more than 100%. The
decision not to exercise highly in-the-money exercisable
options of CEOs indicates their optimistic bias on their
ability to keep the firms' stock prices rising (Malmendier &
Tate, 2005). We follow Campbell et al. (2011)'s method to
calculate the average option moneyness as the realizable
value per option divided by the average exercise price
using executive compensation data from ExecuComp. The
realizable value per option is the total realizable value of
the exercisable options OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL
divided by the number of exercisable options
OPT_UNEX_EXER_NUM. The average exercise price is
the difference between the realizable value per option and
the stock price at the fiscal year end PRCCF.
We construct a dummy variable OC_Options, which
takes a value of 1 from the first year in which a CEO
postpones the exercisable options that are 100% in the
money and 0 otherwise. We require that a CEO exhibits
this behaviour in two consecutive years, rather than
twice during the sample period (as in Malmendier &
Tate, 2008 and Campbell et al., 2011) to ensure that such
behaviour is driven by optimistic bias rather than market
timing (Jenter, 2005). This method of classifying a CEO
as being overconfident from the first year in which (s)he
postpones the exercisable options that are 100% in the
money means that the overconfidence bias is revealed
only years after the CEO is hired and that the same CEO
is classified as being non-overconfident before this event.
This is in line with the evidence presented by Billett and
Qian (2008) that CEOs develop overconfidence through
experience.11
3.3.2 | Tone-based measure of CEO
overconfidence
Prior research shows that tone and linguistic styles in
corporate reports and management discussions provide
important non-quantitative information about firm pros-
pects (Davis et al., 2012; Huang, Teoh, & Zhang, 2013;
Li, 2010) and executives' personality biases (Davis
et al., 2012; Hambrick, 2007). Motivated by the observa-
tion that overconfident CEOs use more optimistic lan-
guage (Hribar & Yang, 2015) we construct OC_MD&A, a
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a CEO uses
more optimistic words than pessimistic words in the
Managerial Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section in
a 10K-filing and 0 otherwise. To classify words into opti-
mistic and pessimistic, we use the textual analysis soft-
ware Diction. While Loughran and McDonald (2015,
p. 1) caution that ‘Diction's optimistic and pessimistic
word lists were not specifically created to analyze finan-
cial documents’, extant literature has not yet reached a
consensus on which dictionary is most appropriate to
analyse the financial statements. The Diction wordlist is
used in numerous contexts to count optimistic and pessi-
mistic words, for example, earnings press release (Davis
et al., 2012) and shareholder litigation (Rogers, Van
Buskirk, & Zechman, 2011).
Our measure is very close to the measure used in
Malmendier and Tate (2005) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012)
who record the optimistic/pessimistic words that the
press describes CEOs. Our tone-based measure uses the
MD&As rather than the press articles for two important
reasons: First, the MD&A section of 10K-filings is one of
the most read and important components of the financial
statements, providing qualitative and forward-looking
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information (Kothari, Li, & Short, 2009; Li, 2010).12 We
expect our tone-based proxy to reveal CEO personality
traits embedded in the non-quantifiable content of these
documents. Second, the MD&As are required by the SEC,
in which the CEOs (and banks) use their own language.
Our measure therefore is not prone to the extent of media
coverage of or the words of the press about individual
CEOs (c.f. Hribar & Yang, 2015).
A potential source of endogeneity in our analysis
could be the measurement error in CEO overconfidence.
To address this concern, we employ several alternative
proxies for overconfidence (discussed in the robustness
check), all of which yield very similar results.
3.4 | Dependent variables
Following Acharya et al. (2017), we use the marginal
expected shortfall MES as a measure of ex ante bank sys-
temic risk. MES is based on a bank's net equity returns
(wi1=w
i
0Þ calculated as the equally weighted average daily
equity return of the bank (Ri) during the 5% worst days
for the market returns in any given year (I5%).
13 Acharya
et al. (2017) show that the information contained in these
‘moderately bad days’ (p. 13), that is, 5% worst days of
the market, can be used to estimate what would happen









t:system is in its 5%tail
Rit
ð2Þ
We use the realized systemic expected shortfall SES
for the ex post systemic risk where SES is calculated as
the return of a bank during the period July 2007–
December 2008 as in Acharya et al. (2017). We measure
investment in private mortgage-backed securities MBS as
the total value of private MBSs held in both trading and
investment portfolios (excluding MBSs that are either
issued or guaranteed by government-sponsored enter-
prises) divided by total assets as in Acharya, Litov, and
Sepe (2013).
3.5 | Control variables
We control for bank-specific characteristics in examining
the relationship between systemic risk and CEO over-
confidence. We include Log(TA), the natural logarithm of
the value of total assets, to proxy for bank size. Prior
research shows that systemic risk increases with bank size
because large banks tend to pursue risky activities and/or
suffer from agency problems that make them more
exposed to liquidity shocks and market failures
(Brunnermeier et al., 2012). Similarly, regulators are reluc-
tant to let larger banks fail (Laeven et al., 2015). We con-
trol for DEBT, the ratio of long-term debt to total assets,
because high leverage could cause liquidity shock and
exacerbate financial risk across the financial system
(Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2011). We include ROA, the ratio of
net income over total assets, because better performance
could shield banks from the risk of defaulting and from
contributing to the systemic risk of the financial sector.
However, higher profitability might also indicate that
banks engage in risky but more profitable non-lending
activities, contributing more to a systemic event
(Brunnermeier et al., 2012). We also control for LOANS
and DEPOSITS, the ratios of loans and deposits over total
assets, respectively. While a large loans portfolio could
make a bank more vulnerable to increase in creditors'
default rates, a small loans portfolio could be complemen-
ted by a larger portfolio of corporate or government bonds,
which could also expose the bank to spikes in credit spread
during a crisis (Beltratti & Stulz, 2012). High deposits, on
the other hand, could be considered as a shock-absorbing
buffer (Laeven et al., 2015). We include MTB, the market-
to-book ratio, to control for differences in bank-specific
investment opportunities (Brunnermeier et al., 2012).
We control for several CEO-specific characteristics:
age, tenure, gender and total compensation. Ser-
fling (2014) finds that older CEOs prefer less risky invest-
ment while younger CEOs pursue riskier investment to
appear talented. Huang and Kisgen (2013) observe that
male CEOs undertake more acquisitions, issue more debt
and place narrower bound on earnings estimates. Defini-
tions for all variables are in Appendix.
3.6 | Summary statistics
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the variables of
interest and bank- and CEO-specific characteristics.
Nearly 40% CEO-years in our sample are classified as
options-based overconfident. Fewer CEO-years are classi-
fied as tone-based overconfident (only 31.5%). This is
comparable to the percentage of overconfident CEOs in
industrial firms reported in Campbell et al. (2011) and
Hirshleifer et al. (2012).14
The average and median values of MES are 0.023 and
0.019, indicating that the average and median returns on
the 5% worst return days for the banks in our sample is
−2.3% and −1.9%, respectively. These are comparable to the
figures reported in Acharya et al. (2017).15 As shown later
in the paper, the average and median values of the ex ante
measure of systemic risk MES are much smaller compared
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to the ex post systemic risk SES, that is, loss in market value
of U.S. banks during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Other
notable statistics in Table 1 are those of bank size and CEO
total compensation. The average bank size is influenced by
the presence of very large banks in our sample and bank
size in our sample varies greatly. This is consistent to other
studies on U.S. banks such as Ellul and Yerramilli (2013).
Similar to bank size, the variation in CEO total compensa-
tion is very high, indicating the heterogeneity in total com-
pensation of bank CEOs in our sample. Indeed, while the
average CEO total compensation over the sample period is
$4.6 million, the maximum total compensation is nearly
$33 million. The variations in total compensation are partly
due to high compensation awarded to star CEOs and partly
because no bonuses are awarded in more than 30% of the
CEO-year observations.16
4 | CEO OVERCONFIDENCE AND
SYSTEMIC RISK
4.1 | CEO overconfidence and
systemic risk
To test whether CEO overconfidence bias is related to
banks' exposure to a systemic event, we use the marginal
expected shortfall MES as dependent variable in the
regressions of Table 2. We use options-based over-
confidence OC_Options in Columns (1) to (3) and tone-
based overconfidence OC_MD&A in Columns (4) to (6).
In all regressions, we cluster the standard errors at the
bank level to control for the correlation of residuals
within CEO-bank pairs (Petersen, 2009). We also include
bank and year fixed effects to control for unobserved het-
erogeneity across banks and over time.
We start with the OLS estimation in Column (1). The
positive coefficient of OC_Options indicates that banks
with overconfident CEOs have higher systemic risk. In
Column (2), we report the WLS estimation, which uses
bank size as weights. This approach is more appropriate
in our analysis due to the size heterogeneity of banks in
our sample. In Column (3), we repeat the regression in
Column (2) after adding CEO-specific variables. The
WLS coefficients of OC_Options increase substantially
compared to the OLS coefficient whilst remaining signifi-
cant at the 1% level once bank size is used to purge
heteroscedasticity. Our results reveal that the economic
impact of CEO overconfidence on systemic risk is consid-
erable. Using the coefficient of OC_Options in Column
(3), which is 0.003, and the mean level of MES of banks
with non-overconfident CEOs of 0.022, on average an
overconfident CEO increases bank systemic risk by a
TABLE 1 Bank characteristics summary statistics
N Mean First quartile Median Third quartile SD
OC_Options 1,236 0.398 0 0 1 0.490
OC_MD&A 1,236 0.315 0 0 1 0.465
MES 1,236 0.023 0.013 0.019 0.028 0.016
MBS 1,236 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.034
LVG 1,236 0.910 0.898 0.912 0.924 0.021
TA ($m) 1,236 79,746 6,025 14,000 45,000 246,997
Log(TA) 1,236 16.705 15.607 16.441 17.628 1.518
DEBT 1,236 0.631 0.572 0.658 0.712 0.107
LOANS 1,236 0.611 0.562 0.648 0.704 0.148
DEPOSITS 1,236 0.710 0.652 0.721 0.784 0.099
MTB 1,236 2.181 1.442 1.954 2.639 1.093
ROA 1,236 0.011 0.009 0.011 0.014 0.005
TOTAL_COMP ($,000) 1,236 4,553 1,405 2,403 5,557 5,319
Log(TOTAL_COMP) 1,236 7.928 7.248 7.785 8.623 0.968
TENURE 1,236 8.558 3 7 12 6.894
AGE 1,236 56.506 53 57 61 6.427
Log(AGE) 1,236 4.028 3.970 4.043 4.111 0.117
MALE 1,236 0.985 1 1 1 0.120
Note: This table shows the summary statistics of the bank and CEO characteristics of the BHCs in our sample.
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substantial 13.6%. This provides strong supports for
Hypothesis H1 that banks with overconfident CEOs have
higher systemic risk than their counterparts with non-
overconfident CEOs.
In all estimations MTB have positive coefficients,
indicating that banks with higher market-to-book
values have higher systemic risk. This is consistent with
previous research (Brunnermeier et al., 2012; Laeven
et al., 2015). The negative coefficients of ROA indicate
that more profitable banks are systemically less risky.
This is in line with the argument that high profitability
reduces banks' default risk and their contribution to a
systemic event (Brunnermeier et al., 2012). In the WLS
estimations, the negative coefficients of DEPOSITS
become statistically significant, indicating that banks
with more deposits are systemically less risky. In Col-
umns (4) to (6), we use the tone-based overconfidence
measure OC_MD&A. Overall, the results are qualita-
tively similar to those using OC_Options. We continue
to find strong evidence supporting Hypothesis H1 that
banks with overconfident CEOs have higher systemic
risk. The coefficients of OC_MD&A are also larger in
the WLS estimations compared to that in the OLS
estimation.
TABLE 2 CEO overconfidence and bank systemic risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OC_Optionst-1 0.0024** 0.0038*** 0.0030**
(0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0015)
OC_MD&At-1 0.0008 0.0020** 0.0018**
(0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0010)
Log(TA) t-1 0.0027** 0.0029** 0.0020 0.0029** 0.0034** 0.0021
(0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0016)
DEBTt-1 −0.0327 −0.0501 −0.0370 −0.0359 −0.0617 −0.0451
(0.0343) (0.0471) (0.0456) (0.0347) (0.0496) (0.0475)
LOANSt-1 0.0014 0.0068 0.0051 0.0007 0.0054 0.0031
(0.0066) (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0064) (0.0056) (0.0054)
DEPOSITSt-1 −0.0090 −0.0193* −0.0212** −0.0108 −0.0217** −0.0228**
(0.0092) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0092) (0.0101) (0.0101)
MTBt-1 0.0016** 0.0019** 0.0018** 0.0019*** 0.0023** 0.0021**
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0009)
ROAt-1 −0.3813*** −0.4200* −0.4848** −0.3686** −0.3886* −0.4687**
(0.1435) (0.2213) (0.2339) (0.1427) (0.2224) (0.2333)
Log(TOTAL_COMP) t-1 0.0014 0.0013
(0.0010) (0.0009)






Constant 0.0046 0.0222 0.0204 0.0054 0.0267 0.0286
(0.0354) (0.0547) (0.0539) (0.0356) (0.0559) (0.0551)
N 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001
R2 .8504 .8607 .8627 .8490 .8586 .8620
Note: This table reports the results of the OLS (Columns 1 and 4) and the WLS (Columns 2, 3, 5 and 6) regressions examining the relationship
between CEO overconfidence and BHCs' systemic risk. The dependent variable is MES, the average stock return of a BHC on the days in which
the market return is in the bottom 5% for the year. All other variables are defined in Appendix. Bank and year fixed effects are included. Clus-
tered by bank robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * Stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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4.2 | CEO overconfidence and mortgage-
backed securities
Table 3 reports the results where we examine the impact
of CEO overconfidence bias on bank investment in
mortgage-backed assets, using MBS as the dependent var-
iable. As in Table 2, we report both OLS and WLS estima-
tions using options-based overconfidence in Columns
(1) to (3) and tone-based overconfidence in Columns
(4) to (6). We find that the coefficients for OC_Options
are positive and statistically significant in all the three
specifications. The WLS coefficient in Column (3) shows
that having an overconfident CEO increases the ratio of
private mortgaged-backed securities over total assets by
0.0073. Using the mean level of MBS of non-
overconfident CEOs of 0.011, on average an over-
confident CEO increases their bank's investment in MBSs
by a substantial 66%. The statistical and economic signifi-
cance of these coefficients provide strong support for
Hypothesis H2 that overconfident CEOs increase their
banks' exposure to systemic risk through increasing their
banks' investment in MBSs. The coefficients of Log(TA),
LOANS and MTB indicate that smaller banks, banks with
lower loans over asset ratio and lower market-to-book
TABLE 3 CEO overconfidence and private mortgage-backed securities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OC_Optionst−1 0.0069*** 0.0079** 0.0073**
(0.0024) (0.0036) (0.0039)
OC_MD&At−1 0.0012 0.0043 0.0039
(0.0021) (0.0038) (0.0037)
Log(TA) t−1 −0.0106*** −0.0086* −0.0126** −0.0098*** −0.0076 −0.0122**
(0.0029) (0.0053) (0.0058) (0.0029) (0.0053) (0.0058)
DEBTt−1 0.0828 0.2205 0.2801* 0.0748 0.1959 0.2607*
(0.0693) (0.1503) (0.1545) (0.0696) (0.1470) (0.1511)
LOANSt−1 −0.0875*** −0.1012*** −0.1058*** −0.0892*** −0.1041*** −0.1104***
(0.0125) (0.0248) (0.0250) (0.0126) (0.0255) (0.0253)
DEPOSITSt−1 0.0194 0.0520 0.0429 0.0152 0.0471 0.0392
(0.0172) (0.0415) (0.0406) (0.0174) (0.0407) (0.0398)
MTBt−1 −0.0030* −0.0051** −0.0065*** −0.0020 −0.0042* −0.0056**
(0.0016) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0015) (0.0022) (0.0022)
ROAt−1 0.2124 0.6901 0.5026 0.2511 0.7564 0.5397
(0.2616) (0.4681) (0.4735) (0.2626) (0.4655) (0.4713)
Log(TOTAL_COMP) t−1 0.0084*** 0.0081***
(0.0027) (0.0028)






Constant 0.1257 −0.0458 −0.0708 0.1245 −0.0358 −0.0520
(0.0816) (0.1819) (0.1832) (0.0823) (0.1795) (0.1789)
N 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001
R2 .7205 .7429 .7515 .7184 .7421 .7513
Note: This table reports the results of the OLS (Columns 1 and 4) and the WLS (Columns 2, 3, 5 and 6) regressions examining the relation-
ship between CEO overconfidence and BHCs' systemic risk. The dependent variable is MBS—total private mortgage-backed securities
divided by total assets. All other variables are defined in Appendix. Bank and year fixed effects are included. Clustered by bank robust stan-
dard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * Stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
LIU ET AL. 9
value are more likely to invest in MBS. When CEO char-
acteristics are controlled for in Column (3), we also find
that the holding of MBSs increases with bank debt and
CEO compensation.
In Columns (4) to (6), we report the regressions using
OC_MD&A. While all other results remain similar, the
coefficients of OC_MD&A are still positive but no longer
statistically significant. This could be because in the later
period of the sample, that is, during and after the
2007–2008 financial crisis many banks remove MBSs
holdings from their balance sheets and the language that
CEOs use appears to be less optimistic (more details in
the next section). The estimation results (not reported
here for brevity) using a subsample that excludes all
observations during 2008–2014 yield positive and statisti-
cally significant coefficients of OC_MD&A.
4.3 | CEO overconfidence and systemic
risk during and after the 2007–2008
financial crisis
We now examine the link between CEO overconfidence
and bank systemic risk during and after the 2007–2008
financial crisis. For this purpose, we do three things: First,
we document changes in CEO overconfidence in three
periods: before, during and after the crisis. Second, we com-
pare the ex post systemic risk SES, that is, bank returns dur-
ing the crisis period of banks with overconfident CEOs and
banks with non-overconfident CEOs. Third, we examine if
the crisis results in a structural break in the link between
CEO overconfidence and bank systemic risk.
Table 4 compares the averages of the annual percent-
ages of overconfident CEOs during and after the crisis
with the average in the pre-crisis period. Before the
2007–2008 crisis, on average every year 43.71% of CEOs
are classified as options-based overconfident. During the
2 years of the crisis, only 37.2% of CEOs are
overconfident. In the post-crisis period, this figure
declines to 22.94%, that is, about half of the pre-crisis fig-
ure. All the differences are significant at the 1% level. The
declines in the percentages of tone-based overconfident
CEOs are even more evident. A total of 40.35% CEOs are
tone-based overconfident before the crisis and this figure
drop to 26.42% during the crisis and 13.43% in the post-
crisis period, which is about a third of the pre-crisis fig-
ure. This indicates that CEOs notably use less optimistic
language during and after the crisis. The reported larger
changes in the percentages of tone-based overconfident
CEOs, compared to options-based, lend support to our
conjecture that the tone-based proxy incorporates more
time-variant variations. All the results remain the same
when we compare the medians instead of the means.
We also compare the average of numbers and per-
centages of optimistic and pessimistic words over the
total number of words in the MD&A sections.17 The aver-
age numbers of both optimistic and pessimistic words in
the MD&As increase steadily over the sample period. The
average percentage of optimistic words during the crisis
period increases to 1.61% from 1.18% in the pre-crisis.
Similarly, the percentage of pessimistic words increases
to 1.46% from 1.10%. The post-crisis average percentage
of optimistic words increases slightly compared to that in
the crisis period while the post-crisis average percentage
of pessimistic words declines slightly. All the differences
are statistically significant at the 1% level. Interestingly,
the length of the MD&As increases considerably over the
three periods, which could indicate concerns over eco-
nomic uncertainty. For example, the average length of
the MD&As in 1994 is 9,541 words, compared to 16,154
words in 2008 and 28,806 words in 2014. We find a simi-
lar trend in the length of the 10K-filings.
Next, we examine whether CEO overconfidence is
associated with ex post systemic risk during the financial
crisis. In the previous section, we find that banks with
overconfident CEOs have higher marginal expected
TABLE 4 CEO overconfidence before and after the financial crisis
% Of overconfident CEOs Optimistic words Pessimistic words
OC_Options OC_MD&A Number % Number %
Pre-crisis years (1994–2006) 43.71% 40.35% 205 1.18% 192 1.12%
Crisis years (2007–2008) 37.20%*** 26.42%*** 264 1.61%*** 239 1.46%***
Post-crisis years (2009–2014) 22.94%*** 13.43%*** 412 1.74%*** 326 1.38%***
Note: This table shows the average annual percentages of overconfident CEOs during the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods using the
options-based and tone-based proxies of overconfidence. The table also reports the annual average number and percentages of optimistic and
pessimistic words over total number of words used in the MD&A section of the BHCs' 10K-filings over three periods: pre-crisis, crisis and
post-crisis. t-Statistics test the hypothesis of no difference between the percentages of overconfident CEOs and of optimistic/pessimistic
words, in the crisis and post-crisis periods compared to the pre-crisis period. ***, **, * Stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively.
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shortfall MES than banks with non-overconfident CEOs.
Unlike MES, which is an ex ante measure of each bank's
tail dependence with the market during the more fre-
quent ‘moderately bad days’, SES is the measure of sys-
temic risk in an infrequent ‘extreme’ tail event (Acharya
et al., 2017, p. 13). We use the stock returns during July
2007 and December 2008 as the ex post bank systemic
risk SES as in Acharya et al. (2017). We partition
108 banks that have stock returns during this period into
two subsamples: banks with overconfident CEOs and
banks with non-overconfident CEOs, using the classifica-
tion in 2006. This is to make sure that our results are not
affected by changes in CEO behaviour or indeed CEO
turnover during the crisis.18 Panel A of Table 5 reports
the means and medians of stock returns of both groups
using the option-based overconfidence measure. On aver-
age banks with overconfident CEOs lost 37.69% of their
market value during the crisis while banks with non-
overconfident CEOs only lost 34.91%. The result is simi-
lar when we compare the median returns. In Panel B, we
repeat the above exercise using tone-based over-
confidence. There are fewer tone-based overconfident
CEOs than options-based overconfident CEOs (26 and
40, respectively), which is consistent with our previous
results in Table 2. We continue to find that the mean
return of banks with overconfident CEOs is lower than
that of banks with non-overconfident CEOs. The median
return of the former, however, is higher than that of the
latter group. Overall, our results indicate that banks with
overconfident CEOs have higher ex post systemic risk
compared to banks with non-overconfident CEOs during
the crisis.
Finally, we investigate the extent to which the link
between CEO overconfidence and bank systemic risk
changes in the post-crisis period. In Table 6, we introduce
a dummy variable PostCrisis that takes a value of 1 for all
the years after the crisis, that is, 2009–2014, and 0 other-
wise. In Column (1), we report the WLS estimation of the
impact of options-based overconfidence on MES, control-
ling for bank characteristics. We interact PostCrisis with
OC_Options and all other bank characteristics. We con-
tinue to find that bank systemic risk increases with CEO
overconfidence. The coefficient of the interaction of
OC_Options and PostCrisis is insignificant, indicating that
the link between CEO overconfidence and bank systemic
risk does not change after the crisis. The negative coeffi-
cient of the interaction of Log(TA) indicates that the
effect of bank size on systemic risk is smaller in the post-
crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period. The statis-
tically significant coefficients of the interactions of
LOANS and DEPOSITS suggest that loans and deposits
become more important in explaining variations in bank
systemic risk after the crisis. We obtain very similar
results in Column (2) where we use tone-based
overconfidence.19
5 | ROBUSTNESS CHECK
5.1 | Alternative measures of CEO
overconfidence
As overconfidence is a psychological cognitive trait
that is not directly observable (Galasso &
Simcoe, 2011; Hambrick, 2007; Hirshleifer et al., 2012),
in this section, we check if our reported results remain
unchanged when we use alternative measures of
overconfidence.
TABLE 5 CEO overconfidence and realized systemic risk during the crisis
Panel A: (OC_Options)
Banks with non-overconfident CEOs (N = 68) Banks with overconfident CEOs (N = 40)
Mean Median Mean Median
SES −34.91% −26.67% −37.69%* −28.26%*
Panel B: (OC_MD&A)
Banks with non-overconfident CEOs (N = 82) Banks with overconfident CEOs (N = 26)
Mean Median Mean Median
SES −34.44% −29.79% −41.91%** −16.59%**
Note: This table compares the average SES, the ex post stock return during the period July 2007–December 2008, of BHCs with overconfident
CEOs with BHCs with non-overconfident CEOs. Panel A partitions the sample into option-based non-overconfident CEO and overconfident
CEOs subsamples. Panel B partitions the sample into tone-based non-overconfident CEO and overconfident CEOs subsamples. t-Statistics
test the hypothesis of no difference between the means (medians) of the non-overconfident and overconfident subsamples. ***, **, * Stand for
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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One might argue that our options-based over-
confidence proxy OC_Options depends on whether a
bank achieves exceptional stock performance, that is,
whether the stock price exceeds the option exercise price
by more than 100%. To address these concerns, we check
whether our results change after we include ‘moderately
overconfident’ CEOs as in Campbell et al. (2011). It is
possible that these CEOs are overconfident but the stock
price of their banks does not exceed the exercise price by
more than 100%. In the first three columns of Table 7, we
repeat the OLS and WLS regressions in Table 2 using
OC_Options67 which classifies a CEO as being over-
confident if s/he delays exercising the options that are
67% in the money (as in Malmendier & Tate, 2005;
Hirshleifer et al., 2012).20 The positive and significant
coefficients of OC_Options67 indicate that bank systemic
risk increases with CEO overconfidence even after we
lower the moneyness cutoff. The magnitudes of the coef-
ficients are smaller than those reported in Table 2,
suggesting that the link between overconfidence bias and
bank systemic risk is stronger among highly over-
confident CEOs. All other results regarding bank-specific
characteristics are consistent with that in Table 2, indi-
cating that our previous results are not affected by how
we construct the overconfidence proxy.
In the last three columns of Table 7, we report the
OLS and WLS estimations using OC_OptionsAll which
classifies a CEO as being overconfident if OC_Options
takes a value of 1 in any year during the period of
study and 0 otherwise. This means if a CEO delays
exercising in-the-money options for any two consecutive
years, the CEO is classified as being overconfident for
the whole period. This is different from OC_Options,
which classifies a CEO as being overconfident only in
the years after s/he delays exercising in-the-money
options. Therefore, OC_OptionsAll is more in line with
the argument that overconfidence bias could be a per-
manent trait (Galasso & Simcoe, 2011). The results
using OC_OptionsAll are quantitatively and qualitatively
similar to that reported in Columns (1) to (3) of
Table 2.
To check the robustness of the tone-based over-
confidence proxy, we repeat our estimation with sev-
eral other proxies using the language in the MD&As.
We construct a ratio of the difference between optimis-
tic words and pessimistic words scaled by the total
number of optimistic and pessimistic words in a
MD&A. We also create several dummy variables that
classify a CEO as being overconfident if the value of
this ratio is in the top 10, 20 and 50% of the sample.
The results of the estimations using both the continu-
ous and binary tone-based overconfidence proxies (not
reported here for brevity) show that bank systemic risk







































Note: This table reports the results of the WLS regressions examining
the relationship between CEO overconfidence and BHCs' systemic
risk. The dependent variable is MES, the average stock return of a
BHC on the days in which the market return is in the bottom 5% for
the year. PostCrisis is the dummy that takes a value of 1 for the years
after the financial crisis, that is, 2009–2014, and 0 otherwise. All other
variables are defined in Appendix. Bank and year fixed effects are
included. Clustered by bank robust standard errors are in parenthe-
ses. ***, **, * Stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively.
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statistically and significantly increases with CEO
overconfidence.
5.2 | CEO overconfidence and bank
leverage
In the framework in Acharya et al. (2017), leverage is an
important predictor for ex post bank systemic risk
because it plays a crucial role in determining bank capital
and the financial distress cost of highly leveraged firms is
high in a crisis. High leverage incentivizes banks to take
on tail risks (Ellul & Yerramilli, 2013) and increases the
financial system fragility (Thakor, 2015a). Indeed,
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) uncover that financial inter-
mediaries are highly leveraged in advance of most finan-
cial crises (see also Ho et al., 2016). Here we explore if
CEO overconfidence is associated with bank leverage
using Acharya et al. (2017)'s approximation of leverage
LVG which is the ratio of quasi-market value of assets to
market value of equity. In Table 8, we repeat the OLS
and WLS estimations of Table 2 using LVG as the
TABLE 7 CEO overconfidence and bank systemic risk: Alternative measures of CEO overconfidence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OC_Options67t−1 0.0007* 0.0018** 0.0019**
(0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0014)
OC_OptionsAllt−1 0.0024** 0.0035*** 0.0026**
(0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0014)
Log(TA) t−1 0.0029** 0.0036*** 0.0021 0.0028** 0.0032** 0.0022
(0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0016)
DEBTt−1 −0.0317 −0.0521 −0.0354 −0.0321 −0.0527 −0.0397
(0.0351) (0.0494) (0.0469) (0.0335) (0.0472) (0.0456)
LOANSt−1 0.0013 0.0067 0.0041 0.0006 0.0053 0.0040
(0.0065) (0.0057) (0.0055) (0.0065) (0.0057) (0.0056)
DEPOSITSt−1 −0.0107 −0.0217** −0.0230** −0.0091 −0.0192* −0.0212**
(0.0094) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0091) (0.0103) (0.0103)
MTBt−1 0.0018** 0.0020** 0.0017* 0.0016** 0.0019** 0.0019**
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008)
ROAt−1 −0.3701** −0.3994* −0.4819** −0.3759*** −0.4072* −0.4762**
(0.1420) (0.2220) (0.2320) (0.1426) (0.2197) (0.2327)
Log(TOTAL_COMP) t−1 0.0013 0.0013
(0.0010) (0.0010)






Constant 0.0012 0.0163 0.0192 0.0033 0.0218 0.0201
(0.0359) (0.0560) (0.0547) (0.0353) (0.0554) (0.0542)
N 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001
R2 .8489 .8585 .8621 .8502 .8601 .8622
Note: This table reports the results of the OLS (Columns 1 and 4) and the WLS (Columns 2, 3, 5 and 6) regressions examining the relation-
ship between CEO overconfidence and BHCs' systemic risk. The dependent variable is MES, average stock return of a BHC on the days in
which the market return is in the bottom 5% for the year. All other variables are defined in Appendix. Bank and year fixed effects are
included. Clustered by bank robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * Stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
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dependent variable.21 The positive and significant coeffi-
cients of OC_Options in the WLS estimations indicate
that banks with overconfident CEOs have higher leverage
than banks with non-overconfident CEOs. The coeffi-
cients of the tone-based overconfidence OC_MD&A
remain positive but only statistically significant in the last
regression. Overall, our results suggest that CEO over-
confidence is associated with bank leverage, which is
consistent with the finding that overconfident CEOs in
non-financial firms issue more debt compared to non-
overconfident CEOs (Malmendier et al., 2011) and that
overconfident CEOs in financial firms increase leverage
more than non-overconfident CEOs prior to the
2007–2008 crisis, making these firms more vulnerable to
the shock of the crisis (Ho et al., 2016).
5.3 | Dynamic panel GMM estimator
To address the concern that the relationship between
CEO overconfidence and systemic risk could be dynami-
cally endogenous such that a bank risk strategy deter-
mines both its exposure to a systemic event and the type
of CEO that it hires, we use a dynamic panel GMM esti-
mator as in Arellano and Bond (1991). Following Ellul
and Yerramilli (2013), we explicitly control for lagged
values of MES and bank characteristics to provide instru-
ments for identifying the relationship between bank sys-
temic risk and CEO overconfidence.
Table 9 presents results of the dynamic GMM regres-
sions in which we use MES as the dependent variable, its
three lags as regressor variables and bank characteristics
TABLE 8 CEO overconfidence and bank leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OC_Optionst−1 0.1619 0.2124* 0.3817*
(0.3549) (0.3110) (0.3664)
OC_MD&At−1 0.1269 0.3170 0.3441*
(0.1710) (0.1986) (0.1935)
Log(TA)t−1 0.4230 0.2728 0.2113 0.4283 0.2756 0.2215
(0.3391) (0.3368) (0.2977) (0.3116) (0.3092) (0.2818)
LOANSt−1 0.9958 1.0044 1.3813 0.9107 0.8566 1.1030
(1.1239) (1.0806) (1.0781) (1.1015) (1.0579) (1.0016)
DEPOSITSt−1 −0.1575 −1.6716 −2.0712 −0.3345 −1.8803 −2.3216
(2.2247) (2.1576) (2.0711) (2.1031) (2.0942) (2.0066)
MTBt−1 −0.7651*** −0.7258*** −0.7466*** −0.7465*** −0.7092*** −0.7109***
(0.2740) (0.2329) (0.2266) (0.2351) (0.2093) (0.2002)
ROAt−1 −64.0518* −64.4757** −72.0933** −63.1558* −61.1067** −68.6369**
(33.8489) (30.0842) (30.5538) (35.1665) (30.7748) (30.6980)
Log(TOTAL_COMP) t−1 0.2250 0.2148
(0.1882) (0.1887)






Constant 2.4287 5.7981 4.2951 2.4496 5.7990 4.5147
(4.0035) (4.6336) (4.1110) (3.8586) (4.4899) (4.1198)
N 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001
R2 .7890 .8075 .8108 .7890 .8084 .8111
Note: This table reports the results of the OLS (Columns 1 and 4) and the WLS (Columns 2, 3, 5 and 6) regressions examining the relation-
ship between CEO overconfidence and BHCs' systemic risk. The dependent variable is LVG—Quasi-market value of assets divided by market
value of equity. All other variables are defined in Appendix. Bank and year fixed effects are included. Clustered by bank robust standard
errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * Stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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lagged four periods or more as exogenous instruments. We
employ the same set of bank and CEO characteristics as
control variables as before. The coefficients of CEO
overconfidence, either measured with the options-based or
tone-based proxy, continue to be positive and significant.
Results of the Sargan test for the validity of instruments
TABLE 9 CEO overconfidence
and bank systemic risk: Dynamic GMM
estimator





MESt−1 0.1471*** 0.1142*** 0.1474*** 0.2634***
(0.0383) (0.0271) (0.0237) (0.0362)
MESt−2 −0.1095*** −0.1355*** −0.0879*** −0.0694**
(0.0232) (0.0316) (0.0233) (0.0331)
MESt−3 −0.1272*** −0.1463*** −0.1177*** −0.1365***
(0.0207) (0.0211) (0.0178) (0.0230)
Log(TA)t−1 0.0038*** 0.0043*** 0.0023** 0.0157***
(0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0014)
DEBTt−1 0.0123 0.0259 −0.0376 −0.1417*
(0.0346) (0.0360) (0.0418) (0.0531)
LOANSt−1 0.0027 0.0080 0.0010 0.0050
(0.0060) (0.0103) (0.0110) (0.0067)
DEPOSITSt−1 0.0059 −0.0084 −0.0088 0.0036
(0.0063) (0.0082) (0.0065) (0.0053)
MTBt−1 0.0015** 0.0010 0.0016* 0.0008
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0012)
ROAt−1 −0.2488** −0.2525*** −0.2091** −0.1153*







Constant 0.0598 0.0178 0.0230 0.0991*
(0.0511) (0.0570) (0.0569) (0.0594)
N 650 650 650 650
Sargan χ2 73.48 67.85 75.12 74.15
Sargan P-value 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Note: This table reports the results of the dynamic GMM regressions examining the relationship
between CEO overconfidence and BHCs' systemic risk. The dependent variable is MES, average
stock return of a BHC on the days in which the market return is in the bottom 5% for the year.
OC_Options is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO holds in-the-money
options at 100% or greater in two successive years, and 0 otherwise. OC_MD&A is an indicator
variable that takes the value of 1 if there are more optimistic words than pessimistic words in
the MD&A section in the BHC's 10K-filing, and 0 otherwise, where optimistic and pessimistic
words are based on Diction. All other variables are defined in Appendix. Bank and year fixed
effects are included. Clustered by bank robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * Stand
for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that our
instruments are valid. Our results remain unchanged
when we employ two lags ofMES and bank characteristics
lagged three periods or more as instruments as in Ellul
and Yerramilli (2013). Overall, the results suggest that
banks with overconfident CEOs have higher systemic risk,
even after controlling for the possible dynamic endo-
geneity between overconfidence and systemic risk.
5.4 | Other tests
We conduct some further robustness tests (results are not
reported for brevity) to check whether results are sensi-
tive to our selected empirical method. We apply the pro-
pensity score matching method, which uses bank-specific
factors to match, without replacement, a bank with an
overconfident CEO with a bank of similar characteristics
with a non-overconfident CEO. We then repeat the
regressions in Tables 2 and 3 for the matched sample. We
continue to find that bank systemic risk increases with
both options-based and tone-based CEO overconfidence
and that banks with overconfident CEOs hold more
mortgaged-backed securities investment. We also use the
language in the 10K-filings, rather than just the MD&A
sections to construct various tone-based proxies of over-
confidence. We use several methods to construct over-
confidence measures, both discrete and continuous,
using optimistic and pessimistic language in the MD&As
and 10K-filings. The results are qualitatively similar to
that using the MD&As but with reduced economic and
statistical significance.
6 | CONCLUSION
We present empirical evidence that banks with over-
confident CEOs have higher systemic risk, invest more in
mortgaged-backed securities and have higher leverage.
During the 2007–2008 financial crisis, U.S. banks with
overconfident CEOs also experienced higher realized sys-
temic risk. We use two proxies for CEO overconfidence
using options exercise behaviour and language in the
Managerial Discussion and Analysis of the 10K-filings.
While the former is more in line with the suggestion that
overconfidence could be a permanent personality trait,
the latter reveals time-variant patterns in CEO over-
confidence bias. We also document that fewer CEOs are
classified as being overconfident during and after the
2007–2008 financial crisis. Our findings point to the role
of biased beliefs, rather than agency problems, in
explaining bank excessive risk-taking behaviour. Over-
confident managers' interests and those of shareholders
can be aligned when the former take risk on behalf of the
latter. While this risk-taking behaviour could be desirable
for CEOs and current shareholders ex ante, it could harm
banks and the financial system as a whole ex post. Our
results seem at odds with that of Bhagat and
Bolton (2014), who argue that bank CEOs engage in
value-decreasing projects that increase short-term returns
to exercise their options at a higher price. Rather, our
results are more in line with the findings of Fahlenbrach
and Stulz (2011) that bank CEOs do not reduce or hedge
their holdings of shares in anticipation of poor outcomes
due to their misjudgement.
Our findings point to the potential consequences of
CEO overconfidence bias beyond individual banks/firms.
Overconfidence bias could encourage CEOs to take desir-
ably sufficient risk, resulting in greater innovative success
(Hirshleifer et al., 2012). Alternatively, it could lead to
value-destroying acquisitions (Malmendier & Tate, 2008)
or weakened lending standards (Ho et al., 2016). We
show that overconfidence can impose external costs
when bank CEOs take risks that are borne by other
financial institutions and the rest of the economy. This
has important implication in the light of the 2007–2008
financial crisis and its effects on the real economy. While
our paper focuses on CEO-biased beliefs, future research
could explore whether and to what extent CEO over-
confidence might affect biased beliefs among investors,
and how the two types of biases are related to bank risk
(as in the model of Thakor, 2015b).22
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1 There is anecdotal evidence of this biased belief among bank
CEOs prior to the 2007–2008 financial crisis. For example, regard-
ing the acquisition of the mortgage specialist Golden West Finan-
cial Corp in July 2007, Wachovia's CEO, Ken Thompson, said
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‘Don't underestimate the advantage of all of a sudden now being
able to offer the Golden West product line through 3,500
Wachovia branches, through Wachovia securities… and through
Wachovia's direct bank…. It's (the slumping mortgage market) not
a big impact to our company’ (Reuters July 18, 2007, Wachovia
CEO optimistic despite mortgage slump). Wachovia's income fell
98% in the fourth-quarter of 2007 following the meltdown in the
housing market and the bank was acquired by Wells Fargo in
December 2008.
2 In their model, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) show that the
CEO has control over the firm when the board of director is inef-
fective in its monitoring role. Research on bank CEO power pro-
vides evidence that a CEO's ability to compel board decisions is
associated with bank risk-taking (Pathan, 2009, see also Ellul &
Yerramilli, 2013) and other policies such as dividend payout
(Onali, Galiakhmetova, Molyneux, & Torluccio, 2016).
3 CoVaR, for example, measures the contagion risk, or the financial
system performance conditional on a realization in the left tail of
the distribution of bank returns (Adrian & Brunnermeier, 2016).
4 For a comprehensive review of different measures of systemic risk
see Bisias et al. (2012).
5 Our data show that banks that experienced heavy losses during
the crisis such as National City Corp., Wachovia and Citigroup,
were all heavily exposed to the mortgage-backed securities in the
pre-crisis period.
6 Thakor (2015a) points out the role of financial innovation that
‘spurred the growth of the subprime mortgage market’ and other
marketable securities that make banks more connected with each
other (as they all were holding similar securities) and more ‘inter-
twined with markets’ (p 2). Of these innovative securities, the
MBS, or more precisely the developments in the subprime mort-
gages, was considered the trigger of the crisis and the interconnec-
tedness of financial institutions via the MBS amplified the initial
shocks (as described in Bernanke et al., 2008 and
Brunnermeier, 2009).
7 For example, neither Chuck Prince of Citigroup nor Ken Thomp-
son of Wachovia are classified as being overconfident based on
their options-exercise behavior during the period of study. Yet
both are often remembered as the overly optimistic bank CEOs
amid the height of the 2007–2008 crisis. In his interview with the
Financial Times on July 9, 2007, Chuck Prince said ‘we are still
dancing’, denying that the problems in the subprime mortgage
market and other concerns could lead to a more systemic impact
on the financial sector. Similarly, Wachovia's MD&A section of
the 10K-filing on February 28, 2008 stated: ‘we remain confident
about our growth prospects’. Both CEOs are classified as being
overconfident by our tone-based measure.
8 However, Malmendier and Tate (2005) argue that it is not always
easy to identify an overconfident CEO ex ante.
9 There are 71 CEO turnover events involving 49 banks in our sam-
ple period. A CEO turnover is defined as a change in the identity
of the CEO in a bank (Campbell et al., 2011). In five events where
the new CEO is considered as overconfident but the outgoing
CEO is not, there is a slight increase in the average bank systemic
risk under the new CEO (measurement of overconfidence and
systemic risk is described in Sections 3.3 and 3.4). In the other
events (41 events where there is no difference between the new
and outgoing CEOs in terms of the overconfidence measurement
and 25 events where the outgoing CEO is considered as over-
confident but the new CEO is not), the average change in bank
systemic risk (between the two regimes) is not statistically and
significantly different from zero. We thank an anonymous referee
for directing us to investigate this issue.
10 See Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012) for a discussion of
dynamic endogeneity.
11 Based on the notion that individuals ‘learn’ to be overconfident
through self-attribution bias, that is, they attribute events that
confirm the validity of their actions to their ability and suppress
information that conflicts with their actions (see Gilovich
et al., 2002 for more details), Billett and Qian (2008) interpret
their finding that overconfident CEOs who make successful
M&As are more likely to acquire again (although subsequent
deals, driven by overconfidence, have poor wealth effects) and
become more optimistic about their firm prospects (as evidenced
by their bullish insider trading activity) as being consistent with
their hypothesis that CEOs develop overconfidence through suc-
cessful acquisition experience.
12 One can argue that managers have incentives to provide optimis-
tic disclosures because the market on average reacts positively to
optimistic disclosures (see, e.g., Yang, 2012). However, litigation
risk (Rogers et al., 2011) and investor skepticism (Kothari
et al., 2009) may deter such actions.
13 As in Acharya et al. (2017), we use average daily data of equity
returns to calculate MES. More details can be found at the Vola-
tility Institute at the NYU Stern School of Business which pro-
vides details of how systemic risk is calculated and publishes
Systemic Risk Rankings (see https://vlab.stern.nyu.edu).
14 Campbell et al. (2011) classify 35% CEO-year observations as
high optimism using the measure that we adopt in our work, that
is, CEOs holding options at 100% or greater moneyness. In Hir-
shleifer et al. (2012), the percentage is 61% but their moneyness
cut-off is 67%.
15 It should be noted that Acharya et al. (2017) report MES for both
BHCs and other financial institutions from June 2006 to June
2007. We compare our statistics with the mean and median MES
of the BHCs in Acharya et al.'s sample.
16 In our sample, there are small differences between banks led by
female CEOs and male CEOs. Female CEOs are also less over-
confident than male CEOs. Nonetheless, as Wolfers points out,
differences between organizations led by female CEOs and those
led by male CEOs ‘should not be exaggerated given the very
small sample of female CEOs’ (Wolfers, 2006, p. 533). The per-
centage of female CEO-years in our sample is 1.5%, which is sim-
ilar to the percentage reported in Wolfers (2006) for industrial
firms (1.3%). Our regression results remain unchanged when the
dummy variable for CEO gender is excluded.
17 The results are similar when we use the ratio of optimistic (pessi-
mistic) words over total words in the 10K-filings.
18 The results are qualitatively similar when we use the 2005
classification.
19 We obtain very similar results when we include CEO characteris-
tics and their interactions with PostCrisis. The results are not
reported here for the sake of brevity.
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20 Campbell et al. (2011) discuss a sensitivity analysis for different
moneyness cutoffs.
21 We exclude DEBT from the set of control variables.
22 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this direction
for future research.
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITION
Name Definition
OC_Options Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for all CEO-years after the CEO postpones the exercise of vested
options that are at least 100% in the money in two successive years and 0 otherwise
OC_Options67 Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a CEO postpones the exercise of vested options that are at least
67% in the money in two successive years and 0 otherwise
OC_OptionsAll Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for all CEO-years if the CEO postpones the exercise of vested options
that are at least 100% in the money in two successive years and 0 otherwise
OC_MD&A Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the number of optimistic words that a CEO uses in the
management discussion and analysis (MD&A) section of the 10K-filing is greater than the number of
pessimistic words, where optimistic and pessimistic words are based on the Diction word list. There are in
total 686 Diction optimistic words (such as ‘praise’, ‘satisfaction’ and ‘inspiration’) and 920 Diction
pessimistic words (such as ‘blame’, ‘hardship’ and ‘denial’)
MES Average return of a BHC on days when the market as a whole is in the tail of its return distribution (the
lowest 5% days of market return) in a given year
MBS Private mortgage-backed securities (BHCK1709 + BHCK1733 + BHCK1713 + BHCK1736 + BHCK3536)
divided by total assets (BHCK2170)
LVG Quasi-market value of assets divided by market value of equity, where quasi-market value of assets is book
value of assets (BHCK2170) minus book value of equity (BHCK3210) plus market value of equity. Market
value of equity is the value of stock price at year end multiplied by number of shares outstanding
Realised SES The ex post stock return during the period July 2007–December 2008
Log(TA) Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets (BHCK2170)
DEBT Long-term debt (BHCK3298) divided by total assets (BHCK2170)
LOANS Total loans (BHCK2122) divided by total assets (BHCK2170)
DEPOSITS Total deposits (BHDM6631 + BHDM6636 + BHFN6631 + BHFN6636) divided by the total assets
(BHCK2170)
MTB Market value of equity divided by total equity capital where market value of equity is the value of stock price
at year end multiplied by number of shares outstanding
ROA Net income (BHCK4300) divided by total assets (BHCK2170)
Log(TOTAL_COMP) Natural logarithm of a CEO's annual total compensation, which comprises salary, bonus, total value of
restricted stock granted, total value of stock option-granted (using Black-Scholes), long-term incentive
payouts and all other bonuses
TENURE Number of years a CEO has held position as CEO in a BHC
Log(AGE) Natural logarithm of the age of a BHC's CEO
MALE Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a CEO is male and 0 otherwise
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